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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2379 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK, 
      Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
June 30, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, Circuit Judge 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 1, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Prada, citing the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
(“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, presents a petition for a writ of mandamus.  He describes 
claims relating to his criminal prosecution similar to those he raised in a previous 
mandamus petition, which we denied.  See In re Womack, No. 15-2064, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9393 (3d Cir. June 5, 2015) (per curiam).  Essentially, he asserts that his criminal 
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prosecution, in which he pleaded guilty to charges of sex trafficking of a minor and sex 
trafficking by force, was a “complex fraud.”  He alleges that the judge, prosecutors, and 
his former counsel violated several federal statutes by participating in his criminal case.  
Womack further alleges that his right, under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1), “to be reasonably 
protected from the accused” is being violated by his detention in a maximum security 
prison.  He asks us, in the “interest of” § 3771(a)(1), to “remove [him] from any further 
harm.”  In his petition, he also appears to seek “the right to be heard” under the CVRA 
and the right to initiate a criminal prosecution of (at least) the judge and prosecutors.            
 In appropriate circumstances, mandamus relief pursuant to the CVRA is available 
under a standard that is different from, and less demanding than, that used in traditional 
mandamus proceedings.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rigas, 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 
2005).  However, relief under the CVRA is not available to Womack here.   
 First, while we have not yet considered exactly what is meant by the term “crime 
victim” under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2), see United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 462 & passim (D.N.J. 2009) (noting the same and providing a 
thorough overview of the caselaw discussing the term), it is difficult to see how the term 
could apply to Womack under the circumstances presented.  However, even assuming 
that he could be considered a crime victim for whom mandamus and other relief is 
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available under § 3771, he has in no way shown that he is being deprived of the rights 
accorded crime victims.  
 Womack’s right to “reasonable protection from the accused” under § 3771(a) is in 
no way compromised in this case by his imprisonment.  The “right to be heard” that 
Womack seeks is a right to “be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district 
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771(a)(4).  However, there are no such proceedings involving those whom Womack 
accuses of committing crimes.  Womack additionally wants those persons he accuses of 
crimes to be prosecuted.  Even if we believed prosecution to be appropriate (which we do 
not), we cannot order their prosecution as some form of relief to him because nothing in 
the CVRA “shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney 
General or any officer under [her] direction.”  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).   
 We note additionally that Womack appears to have applied for relief in the first 
instance in the wrong court.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).  There is no evidence that 
Womack filed a motion seeking relief under the CVRA in the appropriate district court 
before he filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 For these reasons, we deny Womack’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 
